Indonesian democracy takes another hit

Indonesian democracy takes another hit

The Indonesian government has passed revisions to Law No. 34/2004 on the National Military — allowing active military personnel to hold positions in more civil government bodies and ministries — which have ignited dispute among civil society organisations. Despite most Indonesians wanting democracy, readiness to sacrifice democratic processes for economic development poses significant challenges for those seeking to mobilise opposition against an autocratic trajectory of government policy.

The Indonesian government passed proposed revisions to the Armed Forces Law (UU TNI) on 20 March 2025. The revisions to the law have caused outcry among civil society organisations.

The law expands the military’s role by increasing the number of civilian bodies and ministries in which active military personnel can hold positions from 10 to 14 and expands the scope of non-war military operations. These additional areas include activities related to anti-terrorism, disaster management, maritime security and cyber security.

The military is increasingly involved in public programs, including the distribution of free school lunches and preparations for ‘territorial development’ projects. The proposed revisions further reflect President Prabowo Subianto’s clear preference for increasing militarism in public life. Since the amendment passed in Parliament, the military has entered an agreement with Udayana University to provide national defence training to students. In Purwokerto and Merauke, the military has intervened in student protests against the amendment.

Sustaining strong opposition to military intervention in public life is critical to safeguard the hard-won democratic achievements of reformasi — the movement aimed at dismantling the legacies of Suharto’s 32-year dictatorship. Due to a lack of opposition parties in Parliament, this pressure would need to come from the public.

Between 20–29 March, mass protests against the amendment were held in at least 72 cities. While this wave of protests sends hope about the strength of pro-democracy forces in the country, survey data from the past few years suggest challenges to sustaining collective pressure on the government.

Most Indonesians want democracy. In 2024, the Pew Research Center found 85 per cent of Indonesians want a democratic government. This is consistent with World Values Survey data from 2011–18. The 2021 Asian Barometer survey showed 85.8 per cent of Indonesians believe democracy is the best form of government. When contrasted with authoritarianism, 65.5 per cent still prefer a democratic political system.

But democracy means different things for different people and Indonesians may support democracy for varied reasons. There is a difference between intrinsic and instrumental support for democracy. Intrinsic support for democracy rests on the understanding that democracy is valuable due to its core normative principles and institutions, including equal rights, freedoms, free and fair elections and accountability. Instrumental support for democracy associates democracy with potential policy outcomes or benefits, such as redistributive policies, social stability and economic growth.

Though most Indonesians consider democracy desirable, the majority are ready to sacrifice democracy to improve economic development. The 2021 Asian Barometer found that 64.9 per cent of Indonesians believed ‘economic development is definitely more important’ than democracy and, similarly, 68 per cent believed that ‘reducing economic inequality is definitely more important’ than protecting political freedom.

These numbers suggest that most Indonesians’ demands for democracy are conditional. There is a risk of acquiescence if subversions to civil supremacy and other setbacks to democratic politics are framed as measures to guarantee or expedite development. Since he assumed office, Prabowo’s supporters have justified the deployment of military personnel for policy projects in the name of efficiency and effective coordination — and public support of the government remains high. As of late January 2025, Indikator Politik Indonesia also found that 75.8 per cent of Indonesians were satisfied with Indonesia’s democracy.

The slogan ‘democracy’ may have limited effects in rallying opposition to increased militarism because increased military presence is not largely seen to contradict democracy. Although a March 2025 survey by Kompas found that most Indonesians opposed the amendment to the military law, public concerns are related to perceptions of bureaucratic overlap even more so than the threat to democracy. Only 46.8 per cent of people surveyed believed that increased military presence in civil affairs would disrupt democracy.

While World Values Survey data shows that in 2018, most Indonesians considered free elections and civil rights as important to democracy, 55.4 per cent also favoured military intervention in times of government incompetence. Plus, 85 per cent viewed obedience to ‘the rulers’ as a democratic characteristic, indicating a strong preference for order, stability and guidance from the authorities.

Since his election, Prabowo Subianto has demonstrated a distaste and suspicion towards democratic opposition. In February, he dismissed concerns raised in the 2025 #IndonesiaGelap (#DarkIndonesia) protests. On 13 March, he voiced the need to prevent university students from being influenced by ‘those who do not want to see Indonesia succeed’.

Following a protest against lawmakers’ discussion of the revisions to military law on 15 March, an advisor to the defence minister released a video calling the protest illegal and potentially anarchic. These narratives may dissuade people less involved in activism from challenging undemocratic government actions.

Now that the revisions to UU TNI have passed, the parliament has plans to pass several controversial bills in the near future, including the Draft Criminal Procedure Code and bills expanding the power of the police and tightening government restrictions on broadcasting. On social media, pro-democracy groups have been posting educational content about the risk these revisions pose to democracy. The ongoing protests prove that the public can mobilise to defend civil supremacy. The remaining question is how long this mobilisation will sustain.

Fadhilah Fitri Primandari is PhD candidate at the Department of Government, University of Essex. Her doctoral project examines potential gender biases in popular and academic conceptions of democratic consolidation.

Source:  Eastasiaforum